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Inconsistency with the Internal Consistency Test 
INTRODUCTION 
Taxpayers, rejoice. Maryland, pay up. The Supreme Court’s recent 
holding in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne triggered 
some harsh consequences, which included Maryland paying taxpayers 
nearly $200 million in tax refunds.1 The implications of the Court’s 
decision, however, were hidden underneath a murky analysis of the 
constitutionality of a Maryland tax law.2 The Supreme Court ultimately 
struck down the law for violating the dormant Commerce Clause,3 which 
in turn caused the state to make large payouts of refunds to taxpaying 
residents, who, the Court held, had collectively paid millions in 
unconstitutional state taxes.4 
Wynne has immediate practical consequences for states and taxpayers, 
and a glimpse into the Maryland aftermath gives an indication of what 
other states might encounter. After the Supreme Court struck down 
Maryland’s partial tax credit law, determining that it violated the internal 
consistency test, the state cured the unconstitutionality by amending the 
law to now offer a full tax credit.5 Additionally, Maryland chose to apply 
this change retroactively, thus offering a refund to any taxpayer who 
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 1. Bill Turque, Court: Maryland has Been Wrongly Double-Taxing Residents 




 2. See infra Part II.C. 
 3. Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1795 (2015). 
 4. Although the Wynne decision provided no discussion on whether the 
decision would apply retroactively, the Court articulated its rule on retroactivity 
when discussing the application of the Armco decision. See Armco, Inc. v. 
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984). See also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 497 U.S. 916 
(1990). In Ashland, the Court stated the general rule that “constitutional decisions 
apply retroactively to all cases on direct review.” Id. at 918. Exceptions to the 
general rule exist, as articulated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson. 404 U.S. 97, 106 
(1971). Because Wynne likely falls under the general rule and not an exception, 
Maryland chose to apply Wynne retroactively, thus offering refunds.  
 5. H.B. 72, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015), http://mgaleg.maryland 
.gov/2015RS/bills/hb/hb0072f.pdf [https://perma.cc/24P7-KEDZ] (codified as 
amended at MD. CODE ANN., TAX–GEN. § 10-703(a) (West 2016)). See Wynne, 135 
S. Ct. at 1806. 




overpaid taxes under the unconstitutional law.6 This decision will cost 
Maryland an estimated $200 million in refunds,7 and it also means that 
Maryland will collect nearly $40 million less in tax revenue going 
forward.8 This tax revenue decrease means budget cuts for Maryland 
counties, which might result in cutting some services offered to residents.9 
These changes in Maryland are just the beginning. Some commentators 
have speculated that New York tax law might encounter a challenge 
similar to the one in Wynne,10 while Kansas has already issued guidance 
on its tax law changes under Wynne.11 The consequences in Maryland, 
New York, and Kansas foreshadow what other states will likely suffer if 
and when their similar tax laws are challenged. 
Unfortunately, the broader legal implications of Wynne are far less 
clear than its practical ones for the resident taxpayers of Maryland and 
other states. Wynne presented the Court with the opportunity to clarify a 
historically confusing and ambiguous area of dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine, but the Court’s opinion in Wynne failed to meet this challenge.12 
                                                                                                             
 6. Bill Turque, Maryland, Opponent of Wynne Tax Case, Now Encouraging 
Residents to Seek Refunds, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.washington 
post.com/local/md-politics/2015/09/28/657e4c4c-6613-11e5-8325-a42b5a459b1e 
_story.html [https://perma.cc/44PK-45KW]. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 7. Turque, supra note 6. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. After 
Maryland’s decision to apply its tax amendment retroactively, Maryland instructed 
taxpayers to collect any authorized refunds for any taxes overpaid to Maryland. The 
Maryland comptroller office issued a bulletin informing Maryland taxpayers of the 
required action for collecting refunds. Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. 
Wynne: Frequently Asked Questions, COMPTROLLER OF MD., http://taxes.maryland 
taxes.com/Individual_Taxes/Individual_Tax_Types/Income_Tax/Tax_Information/ 
Wynne_Case/Initial_Wynne_FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7WF-PBCW] (last 
updated Dec. 7, 2015). 
 8. Turque, supra note 1. 
 9. Bill Turque & Donna St. George, Leggett Proposes $50 Million in Cuts to 




 10. Ashlea Ebeling, Wynne Decision Boon To NYC Pied-A-Terre Owners, 
FORBES (May 21, 2015, 7:59 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2015 
/05/21/wynne-decision-boon-to-nyc-pied-a-terre-owners/#2715e4857a0b50a0d40f5 
502 [https://perma.cc/ZKV6-QQUM].  
 11. Brian Kirkell, Kansas DOR Provides Guidance in Response to Wynne, 
RSM (Aug. 11, 2015), http://rsmus.com/what-we-do/services/tax/tax-alerts/kansas-
dor-provides-guidance-in-response-to-wynne.html [https://perma.cc/7TRC-RZF4].  
 12. See, e.g., Bradley W. Joondeph, The Meaning of Fair Apportionment and 
the Prohibition on Extraterritorial State Taxation, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 149 




Recent history of state taxation cases shows the Court wavering between 
two tests—the Complete Auto test and the internal consistency test—with 
little rhyme or reason.13 In deciding whether the Maryland tax violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause, the Court in Wynne applied the internal 
consistency test without satisfactory explanation as to why and failed to 
specifically repudiate its past inconsistencies. As a result, lower courts 
must grapple with Wynne’s future legal implications: does it actually 
announce a new controlling standard, or does it simply perpetuate the 
confusion that its predecessor cases had sown? 
Honing in on the Court’s confusing jurisprudence, this Comment 
argues that Wynne should be read as identifying the internal consistency 
test as the leading standard for state taxation analysis. Even in light of the 
test’s shortcomings, which the four dissenting Justices identified, the 
benefits of the internal consistency test make it the preferable choice—
namely because of its simplicity, its broad scope, and its consistency with 
state autonomy. In endorsing the internal consistency test, however, the 
majority opinion in Wynne still had its weaknesses, leaving questions open 
for courts applying the test in future state taxation cases. 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the erratic history of 
state taxation under the dormant Commerce Clause. Part II explains the 
divided Supreme Court’s most recent analysis in Comptroller of the 
Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne. Finally, Part III argues that the Court 
correctly chose the internal consistency test as the leading standard but 
should have presented its final decision more clearly. 
I. THE CONFUSED STATE OF STATE TAXATION 
Courts often evaluate challenged state tax laws within the framework 
of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. In light of that focus, this 
Comment first provides a brief overview of the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine and then explains more specifically the doctrine’s role in state 
taxation cases. 
                                                                                                             
(2002) (noting that “the [Supreme] Court's state tax decisions over the past century 
have hardly followed a consistent or logical path”).  
 13. See infra note 50. For an overview of the internal consistency test’s 
application over time see Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal Consistency” Dead?: 
Reflections on an Evolving Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 61 
TAX L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Is “Internal Consistency” Dead?].  




A. Overview of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Although the Commerce Clause explicitly grants Congress the power 
to regulate interstate commerce,14 the Supreme Court has long recognized 
that this affirmative grant of power also implies a negative command that 
prohibits states from burdening interstate commerce.15 The negative 
command is known as the dormant Commerce Clause16 and directs that 
states do not have the ability to regulate interstate commerce absent 
congressional action to do so.17  
In general, the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from 
enacting laws that favor commerce within their own borders to the 
detriment of other states, thus addressing a fear that dates back to the 
beginning of the Union.18 This action by the states is known as “economic 
protectionism”—that is, protection of intrastate economic interests while 
burdening interstate interests.19 Throughout history, courts have used the 
dormant Commerce Clause to strike down state laws that burden interstate 
commerce, either on the face of the law or through the effects of the law.20  
                                                                                                             
 14. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “to regulate 
commerce . . . among the several States”). 
 15. See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 
(1984); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. 
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995). 
 16. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 514 U.S. at 179–80 (discussing the dormant 
Commerce Clause). 
 17. See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 
(2015). 
 18. Id. See also Dan T. Coenen, Why Wynne Should Win, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
EN BANC 217, 241–42 (2014). Coenen discusses the history of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, stating that “the spirit that lay behind replacing the Articles of 
Confederation . . . was not centered on preserving the powers of the states, 
particularly with regard to local disruptions of free-flowing interstate trade.” Id. 
He notes that Alexander Hamilton echoed that same notion in The Federalist No. 
22, “condemning the very set of laws at which the dormant Commerce Clause 
continues to take aim.” Id. 
 19. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008). 
 20. See Jennifer L. Larsen, Comment, Discrimination in the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 49 S.D. L. REV. 844, 854 (2004) (discussing the modes of discrimination in 
the dormant Commerce Clause). Larsen distinguishes between three modes of 
discrimination: discrimination on the face of the statute, discrimination in the effects 
of the statute, and discrimination in the purpose behind the statute. Id. Discrimination 
in effect and discrimination in the purpose operate similarly with similar outcomes 
and thus could be categorized together. Id. 




Bacchus Imports provides a good example of the dormant Commerce 
Clause in action. In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, the Court struck down 
a Hawaii liquor tax that offered a special exemption to liquor companies 
using okolehao in their products.21 Okolehao was a local plant grown only 
in Hawaii and thus any liquor company eligible for the tax exemption 
would likely be a Hawaiian company.22 The Court found that although this 
law did not facially discriminate against interstate commerce, by perhaps 
specifically offering the tax exemption to “Hawaiian liquor companies 
only,” the law essentially had a discriminatory effect by offering the 
exemption based on the usage of a local plant.23 Decisions like Bacchus 
Imports highlight the Court’s ongoing commitment to eliminate intrastate 
protectionism and ensure a free flow of economic activity between and 
across state borders.24 
B. State Taxation Under the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Many constitutional challenges to state laws relate to state taxation, as 
seen in Bacchus Imports. The Supreme Court has noted that although a 
state may have the appropriate authority to tax a certain taxpayer, the tax 
imposed may not be imposed in a manner that “unduly burden[s] interstate 
commerce.”25 To determine whether a state tax law “unduly burdens” 
interstate commerce, courts have historically analyzed the law under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.26 The Court’s analysis, however, has not 
always been clear, thus creating a storied history for state taxation analysis 
under the dormant Commerce Clause.27 
1. Two Tests: Complete Auto and Internal Consistency  
In recent years, the Court has utilized two tests to analyze state 
taxation questions under the dormant Commerce Clause: the Complete 
                                                                                                             
 21. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 264, 263−64 (1984). 
 22. Id. at 265. 
 23. Id. at 271. 
 24. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky., 553 U.S. at 337–38 (discussing economic 
protectionism). 
 25. Quill Corp. v. N.D., 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.7 (1992).  
 26. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Quill 
Corp., 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 27. For discussion of the Court’s early approach to state taxation see 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 282–85 (1977). 




Auto test28 and the internal consistency test.29 Under the Complete Auto 
test, a state tax survives a dormant Commerce Clause challenge if the tax 
is applied to an activity with a sufficient nexus to the state; is fairly 
apportioned; is not discriminatory against interstate commerce; and is 
fairly related to services the state provides.30 Under the internal 
consistency test, a court asks whether interstate commerce would be 
burdened if every state imposed the same tax law as the challenged law; a 
tax passes this test if interstate commerce would not be so burdened.31 
Although the factors of the Complete Auto test are interrelated and 
overlapping,32 each factor is discrete. The “sufficient nexus” factor 
requires that the taxed activity be closely connected to the taxing state.33 
For example, the taxing state has a sufficient nexus to the sales of a local 
restaurant because all the sales occur within the state.34 The nexus is more 
obtuse, however, when an out-of-state seller has only minimal contacts 
with a state, such as when the seller merely sends mailings to in-state 
residents.35 The “fairly apportioned” factor requires that a state tax only 
the value of the activity that occurs within the state.36 If a taxpayer had 
property situated on the Louisiana–Mississippi state line, with half the 
property located in Louisiana and the other half in Mississippi, Louisiana 
could tax the revenue generated from the portion of the property located 
in Louisiana. Likewise, Mississippi could tax only the revenue generated 
                                                                                                             
 28. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 183 (1995) 
(referencing the Complete Auto test and its application in a line of cases); Jesse 
H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The 
Object-Measure Approach, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 196−97 (1998).  
 29. Is “Internal Consistency” Dead?, supra note 13, at 2–9 (discussing the 
development of the internal consistency test). See also JEROME HELLERSTEIN & 
WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 4-190–4-246 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing 
the application of the internal consistency test). 
 30. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279.  
 31. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 514 U.S. at 185. 
 32. Choper & Yin, supra note 28, at 199 (discussing the problem with the 
Complete Auto test). 
 33. See Okla. Tax Comm’n, 514 U.S. at 184 (stating that “it has long been 
settled that a sale of tangible goods has a sufficient nexus to the State in which the 
sale is consummated to be treated as a local transaction taxable by that State”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Quill Corp. v. N.D., 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992). Just determining 
whether a sufficient nexus exists is often problematic and requires very fact-
intensive inquires. For more information on finding a sufficient nexus see Julie 
Roman Lackner, The Evolution and Future of Substantial Nexus in State Taxation 
of Corporate Income, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 1387 (2007). 
 36. See, e.g., Joondeph, supra note 12, at 150. 




from the property located within its borders. Fair apportionment thus helps to 
ensure that each state taxes only its “fair share” of interstate activity or 
transactions.37 The “nondiscriminatory” factor prohibits states from imposing 
a larger tax burden on interstate actors than intrastate actors.38 Finally, the 
“fairly related” factor requires that the tax be imposed only on taxpayers who 
benefit from services that the taxing state provides.39  
The Court created the Complete Auto test to require courts to go beyond 
scrutinizing the plain language of a statute and consider the practical effects 
of a tax, thus recognizing that the practical effects are most relevant when 
assessing burdens on interstate commerce.40 Although the Court has applied 
the Complete Auto test in a variety of state taxation cases,41 it has inexplicably 
varied its approach in others.42  
The second test used by the Court in state taxation cases is the internal 
consistency test. The internal consistency test is simpler in form than the 
multi-factor Complete Auto test. The internal consistency test asks whether 
interstate commerce would be burdened if every state imposed the same tax 
law as the particular state law under review.43 For example, if every state 
imposed a tax on out-of-state visitors based on the number of days the visitors 
remained in the state, many citizens would minimize their visits to other states. 
As a result, citizens would engage in less interstate activity, such as staying in 
hotels and eating at restaurants in other states, and instead remain in their own 
states when possible. 
In contrast to the Complete Auto test, the Court, in applying the internal 
consistency test, has emphasized the importance of focusing on the structure 
of the law, and not on the practical consequences.44 Focusing on the structure 
of the tax, however, directly conflicts with the rationale underlying the 
                                                                                                             
 37. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260−61 (1989). 
 38. See id. at 265–66 (discussing the third factor of the Complete Auto test). 
 39. Id. at 266–67. 
 40. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
 41. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 183 (1995) 
(referencing the Complete Auto test and its application in a line of cases); Choper & 
Yin, supra note 28, at 196. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 
U.S. 609 (1981) (upheld severance tax on coal); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise 
Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (upheld corporate franchise tax); Okla. Tax Comm’n, 
514 U.S. 175 (upheld gross receipts tax on transportation ticket sales). 
 42. See Is “Internal Consistency” Dead?, supra note 13; HELLERSTEIN & 
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 29. 
 43. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 514 U.S. at 185. 
 44. Id. See also Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, Comptroller v. Wynne: 
Internal Consistency, A National Marketplace, and Limits on State Sovereignty to 
Tax, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 267, 272 (2015) (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n, 514 
U.S. at 185). 




Complete Auto test, which focuses on the practical effects of a tax.45 
Additionally, when the Court initially introduced the internal consistency test, 
it stated that internal consistency functioned as a component of fair 
apportionment,46 thus implying that the two tests could and should work 
together in guiding state taxation analysis.47 After its formal introduction, 
however, the internal consistency test began to operate outside of the fair 
apportionment context, sometimes being used as a freestanding test of its 
own48 and at other times being used to supplement other factors of the 
Complete Auto test.49 
2. Application of the Tests 
Although the Complete Auto test and the internal consistency test have 
existed concurrently, the Court has provided no guidance as to when each test 
applies and has wavered between the two tests in recent history.50 American 
                                                                                                             
 45. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 514 U.S. at 185. See also Knoll & Mason, supra note 
44, at 272. 
 46. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983). 
A Westlaw query evidences the Court first introduced the actual terminology 
“internal consistency” in this case.  
 47. See Joondeph, supra note 12, at 149. 
 48. Is “Internal Consistency” Dead?, supra note 13, at 2–9 (discussing the 
development of the “internal consistency” test). 
 49. See, e.g., id. at 4 (noting the Court’s application of the “internal consistency” 
test to evaluate whether a tax discriminated against interstate commerce in Armco). 
 50. Justice Scalia implicitly recognizes this issue in his concurrence in the later 
American Trucking case, stating that he concludes the tax in question does not violate 
the dormant Commerce Clause “without adverting to various tests from our wardrobe 
of ever-changing [dormant] Commerce Clause fashions,” listing the Complete Auto 
test and internal consistency test as two separate items in the wardrobe. Am. Trucking 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 439 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). Below is a timeline showing the Court’s pattern of applying the two tests 
erratically: 
Year Case Test 
1977 Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. 274 Birth of Complete Auto test 
1983 Container Corporation, 463 U.S. 159 Birth of internal consistency test 
1984 Armco, 467 U.S. 638 Internal consistency 
1987 American Trucking I, 483 U.S. 266 
Internal consistency 
Lower court – Compete Auto 
1988 D.H. Holmes, 486 U.S. 24 Complete Auto 
1989 Goldberg, 488 U.S. 252 Complete Auto 
1995 Okla. Tax Comm’n, 514 U.S. 175 Complete Auto and internal consistency 
2005 American Trucking II, 545 U.S. 429 Internal consistency (exception) 
2015 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 
Internal consistency 
Lower court – Complete Auto 
 




Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner, a case in which the Supreme Court 
used the internal consistency test and the lower court used the Complete Auto 
test, illustrates the confusion that the concurrency of the two tests creates.51  
A few years before American Trucking, the Supreme Court decided 
Complete Auto and provided several factors and rules for future courts to 
consider when deciding state taxation cases under dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges.52 Then, in American Trucking, the lower court followed the 
Court’s lead in Complete Auto and applied the rules and factors from that 
decision.53 The Supreme Court, however, despite the Court’s Complete Auto 
decision and the lower court’s analysis, applied the internal consistency test 
with no explanation whatsoever for its decision not to apply the Complete 
Auto test.54 The Court continued to waver between the two tests until the 
1990s when the two tests were combined.55 
3. Merging of the Two Tests 
After the Court utilized the internal consistency test as a freestanding 
analysis on state taxation, the Court in Oklahoma Tax Commission merged 
the two into one analysis.56 In that case, the Court began by analyzing the 
challenged tax under the Complete Auto test, walking through each of the 
four factors and deciding whether the tax met each factor.57 Upon arriving 
                                                                                                             
 51. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987). 
 52. See id. The Court mentioned Complete Auto only when listing general 
rules, id. at 295, or when addressing the lower court decisions. Id. at 277. 
Similarly, in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, the Court applied the internal consistency 
test to analyze a state tax without mention of the Complete Auto test. 467 U.S. 638 
(1984). The majority references Complete Auto Transit only once in a footnote 
discussing the principle of fair apportionment. Id. at 643. See also Tyler Pipe 
Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987). The Court in 
Tyler Pipe yet again applied the internal consistency test with little mention of the 
Complete Auto test. Id. 
 53. Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 282; HELLERSTEIN & HELLESTEIN, supra note 29, 
at 4-193–4-195 (discussing the application of the internal consistency test).  
 54. See supra note 52. 
 55. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989) (tax on telephone calls 
analyzed using Complete Auto); D.H. Holmes Co. Ltd. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 
24 (1988) (use tax analyzed using Complete Auto); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. 
Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (severance tax analyzed using Complete Auto); 
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995) (sales tax on bus 
transportation tickets analyzed using both Complete Auto and internal 
consistency). 
 56. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 514 U.S. at 185. 
 57. Id. at 184–200. 




at the fair apportionment factor, the Court incorporated the internal 
consistency test.58 Namely, in asking whether the tax was fairly 
apportioned, the Court turned to the internal consistency test.59 Internal 
consistency, however, was not the only inquiry used for this factor.  
When considering fair apportionment, the Court created a two-step 
analysis.60 First, the Court asked whether the tax passed the internal 
consistency test.61 Only if the tax passed the internal consistency test did 
the Court require the tax to pass a separate, “external consistency” test.62 
The external consistency test asks whether the law imposes a tax only on 
the portion of interstate activity “fairly attributable to [the] economic 
activity” occurring within the taxing state.63 Per the Court’s analysis in 
Oklahoma Tax Commission, if a tax passes both the internal consistency 
test and the external consistency test, the tax is deemed to be fairly 
apportioned, thus satisfying that factor of the Complete Auto test.64 
Despite the step-by-step analysis provided in Oklahoma Tax 
Commission, in which the Court used both the Complete Auto test and the 
internal consistency test, the Court reverted to its old ways and 
intermittently applied a freestanding internal consistency test unmoored 
from the Complete Auto test.65 Moreover, as the next Section illustrates, 
the Court seldom paused to explain its departures in this respect. 
4. Ignoring the Internal Consistency Test 
Further complicating the state taxation analysis, ten years after 
Oklahoma Tax Commission, the Court seemingly retreated from the 
internal consistency test altogether in American Trucking Associations, 
Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission when it upheld a Michigan 
state flat tax66 that did in fact violate the test.67 In this case, Michigan 
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. at 185. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. (citations omitted). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429 
(2005). 
 66. Although Michigan characterized the levy on truckers as a “fee,” the Court 
analyzed the levy as a “tax” and identified the levy as a tax throughout the opinion. 
See, e.g., id. at 438. For example, the Court states that “Michigan's fee . . . does not 
seek to tax a share of interstate transactions.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 67. Id. at 437–38 (applying the internal consistency test). See also HELLERSTEIN 
& HELLERSTEIN, supra note 29, at 4-196–4-198. 




imposed an annual flat tax of $100 on trucks that engaged in intrastate 
operations in Michigan.68 Under the law, any trucker who made any local 
haul in Michigan, such as from Michigan City A to Michigan City B, owed 
the flat tax regardless of whether the trucker made one local haul per year 
or 100 local hauls per year.69 The challengers argued that the tax burdened 
interstate truckers and benefited Michigan truckers because local Michigan 
truckers made frequent hauls in Michigan and likely paid less per haul than 
interstate truckers who made infrequent hauls in Michigan.70  
On this question, the Court agreed with the petitioners, concluding that 
the tax did in fact violate the internal consistency test.71 According to the 
Court, if all states imposed this challenged tax law, interstate truckers who 
carried both interstate and local hauls would be taxed more per haul than 
intrastate truckers who carried only local hauls—and thus interstate 
commerce would be burdened because truckers would be encouraged to 
carry only local hauls.72 Notwithstanding this finding, however, the Court 
held that the tax did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, emphasizing 
that the burden on interstate commerce resulted from trucking companies 
choosing to engage in intrastate business—local hauls in Michigan—rather 
than choosing to engage in interstate business.73 Thus, the Court applied 
the internal consistency test—not the Complete Auto test—but ignored the 
result, essentially making an exception to the rule. 
The Court’s ad hoc application of the Complete Auto test and the 
internal consistency test, in addition to the unprecedented result reached 
in American Trucking, has left many questions open for courts analyzing 
state taxes under dormant Commerce Clause challenges. Although 
Maryland’s tax law presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to 
clarify the analysis, the Court in Wynne did little to clear up this murky 
area of law. 
                                                                                                             
 68. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 29, at 4-196–4-198. 
 69. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 545 U.S. at 431–32.  
 70. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 29, at 4-196–4-198. 
 71. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 545 U.S. at 438. The Court stated, “We must 
concede that here, as petitioners argue, if all States did the same, an interstate 
truck would have to pay fees totaling several hundred dollars, or even several 
thousand dollars, were it to ‘top off’ its business by carrying local loads in many 
(or even all) other States.” Id. Fundamentally, the Court refused to strike down a 
flat tax on local business under the internal consistency test, even when it logically 
failed the test. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 29, at 4-196–4-198. 
 72. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 545 U.S. at 438.  
 73. Id. at 438. 




II. THE WIN FOR THE WYNNES  
In Wynne, the Court applied the internal consistency test to strike 
down a Maryland state tax law.74 The Court gave little explanation for its 
decision to apply the test, despite the lower court’s thorough analysis 
under the Complete Auto test that resulted in the same conclusion. The 
doctrine concerning dormant Commerce Clause limits on state taxation 
was ripe for clarification in Wynne, but the Supreme Court let the 
opportunity go to waste. 
A. Facts: Taxing the Wynnes 
The Wynne case involved a challenge to Maryland’s personal income 
tax law.75 The Maryland law included three distinct parts: a tax on the 
income of Maryland residents earned within the state, consisting of a 
“state” portion and a “county” portion; a tax on the income of Maryland 
residents earned outside the state; and a tax on the income of nonresidents 
earned within the state, consisting of a “state” portion and a “special 
nonresident tax” portion.76 Additionally, Maryland offered a partial tax 
credit for taxes that its residents paid to other states for income earned in 
that other state.77 Maryland law, however, allowed this credit to offset only 
state taxes owed to Maryland rather than both state and county taxes, 
making it a partial tax credit.78  
Maryland residents John and Jane Wynne earned personal income in 
multiple states because of their investment in an S corporation.79 The 
income earned by the corporation passed through to the Wynnes as 
shareholders, meaning that for tax purposes, the Wynnes earned income 
in as many states as the corporation earned income.80 When filing their 
Maryland tax return, the Wynnes claimed a full income tax credit for all 
the income taxes they paid to other states on behalf of the corporation.81 
Under the Maryland tax law, however, the Maryland comptroller assessed 
a tax deficiency for the Wynnes, citing the Maryland law that offered only 
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a partial tax credit for taxes paid to other states rather than a full tax 
credit.82 Specifically, the Maryland tax law allowed the Wynnes to apply 
the credit against only state taxes owed to Maryland, but not against county 
taxes owed.83 
B. The Lower Courts’ Analysis of Maryland’s Tax 
The Wynnes challenged the comptroller in the Maryland tax court, 
claiming the tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause.84 The court 
affirmed the tax deficiency and upheld the tax law.85 On appeal, the Circuit 
Court for Howard County reversed the tax court decision, finding that the 
Maryland law violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it failed to 
offer a full tax credit on taxes paid to other states.86  
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, Maryland’s highest court, evaluated 
the tax under the Complete Auto test and affirmed the lower court’s decision 
that the law violated the dormant Commerce Clause.87 The Wynnes did not 
dispute that the tax satisfied the first and the fourth requirements of the test, 
recognizing that a sufficient nexus existed between the tax and Maryland 
and that the tax was fairly related to services Maryland provided.88  
The court limited its analysis to the remaining two requirements of the 
Complete Auto test: that the tax be fairly apportioned and that it be 
nondiscriminatory.89 To determine whether the Maryland tax was fairly 
apportioned, the court applied the internal consistency and external 
consistency tests, as the Supreme Court did in Oklahoma Tax Commission.90 
Under the internal consistency test, the court asked whether interstate 
commerce would be burdened if every state imposed a state tax that offered 
only a partial tax credit for income taxes paid to other states.91 The court 
answered this question affirmatively, reasoning that residents with interstate 
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income would pay double taxes on a portion of their income, while 
residents with only intrastate income would not—thus burdening interstate 
commerce by encouraging taxpayers to work only within their own 
states.92 In light of the American Trucking decision, the court recognized 
the possibility that a tax might fail the internal consistency test yet still be 
valid under the dormant Commerce Clause.93 Although scant, the court 
distinguished American Trucking. The court identified the annual trucker 
flat tax in American Trucking as a “toll on in-state activity,” which is 
uniformly assessed on all businesses engaged in local activity, whereas the 
Maryland tax was on “business performed and income earned” outside the 
state.94 
Although courts need to address the external consistency test only if a 
tax first passed the internal consistency test, the court addressed external 
consistency as a matter of prudence.95 Under the external consistency test, 
the court asked whether the portion of interstate income Maryland taxed 
was fairly attributable to the intrastate portion of the revenue-earning 
activity, that is, fairly attributable to activity occurring within the state.96 
In this case, the revenue-earning activity would be the corporation’s 
business and operations—most of which occurred outside of Maryland.97 
Given that fact, the court found that the tax was not fairly attributable to 
any intrastate portion of the revenue-earning activity because the tax 
applied to income the corporation earned outside the state of Maryland.98 
Despite the court’s finding that the Maryland tax failed the fair 
apportionment requirement by being both internally and externally 
inconsistent, and thus likely violated the dormant Commerce Clause, the 
court still went on to apply the final requirement of the test, which required 
that the tax be nondiscriminatory.99 
The court concluded that Maryland’s tax was discriminatory by 
analogizing the tax scheme to prior cases in which the Supreme Court 
found tax laws discriminatory; the primary case considered was Fulton 
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Corporation v. Faulkner.100 In Fulton, North Carolina imposed a tax on 
the value of corporate stock that North Carolina residents owned, but 
reduced the tax if the corporation’s income was subject to a North Carolina 
tax.101 The Fulton Court found that this tax discriminated against out-of-
state corporations because the residents who owned stock in corporations 
that conducted business in North Carolina received a greater tax benefit 
than those residents owning stock in corporations that conducted business 
in another state.102 Following the logic of Fulton, the court ruled that the 
Maryland tax law had the same effect as North Carolina’s tax scheme, and 
differed only in form, because both laws resulted in higher tax rates on 
interstate activity than intrastate activity.103 North Carolina fundamentally 
raised its own tax rate on interstate activity by offering a tax reduction to 
qualified shareholders, whereas Maryland’s tax rate on interstate activity 
was raised because of the interaction between other states’ income taxes and 
Maryland’s failure to grant a full tax credit for those taxes paid.104 Finding 
that the Maryland tax failed the fair apportionment and nondiscrimination 
requirements, the court struck down the Maryland tax for failing the 
Complete Auto test and held that it violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause.105 
C. The Supreme Court’s Analysis 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari106 and ultimately held that the 
Maryland tax scheme violated the dormant Commerce Clause.107 The 
Court found that the tax failed the internal consistency test and supported 
its conclusion by analogizing to prior cases on point.108  
1. Application of the Internal Consistency Test 
The Court began its analysis by applying the internal consistency test 
to the Maryland tax law to determine whether the tax burdened interstate 
commerce.109 The Court stated that the virtue of the internal consistency 
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test is that it helps courts distinguish between two distinct categories of 
taxes: 
(1) [those] that inherently discriminate against interstate commerce 
without regard to the tax policies of other states, and (2) [those] that 
create disparate incentives to engage in interstate commerce (and 
sometimes result in double taxation) only as a result of the 
interaction of two different but nondiscriminatory and internally 
consistent schemes.110 
Any state tax law that falls into the first category, the Court emphasized, 
will generally qualify as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.111 
The Court concluded that Maryland’s tax inherently discriminated 
against interstate commerce112 by asking whether interstate commerce 
would be burdened if every state adopted a law like Maryland’s tax law, 
which offered only a partial tax credit for income taxes paid to other 
states.113 The Court found that the tax burdened interstate commerce 
because state residents would likely choose to work within their own state if 
possible to pay less in taxes.114 
In advancing this analysis, the majority dismissed the dissent’s suggestion 
that its holding would create an unwanted “rule of priority” between 
residence-based taxes and source-based taxes.115 Residence-based taxes refer 
to the taxes imposed by the state where the taxpayer resides, while source-
based taxes refer to taxes imposed by the state where the taxpayer earns 
income.116 The Wynne outcome seemingly creates a rule of priority, whereby 
source-based taxes will always trump residence-based taxes on the same 
income.117 By holding that the Maryland tax violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause, the Court struck down the residence-based tax and allowed the source-
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based taxes to survive.118 The majority, however, denied that Wynne 
established a rule of priority by offering the unsatisfactory explanation that 
Maryland could cure its unconstitutional tax scheme and keep its residence-
based tax by offering a full tax credit.119  
2. Support from Precedent 
The Court also emphasized that precedent supported its conclusion.120 
The Court explained that contrary to the dissent’s argument, the Wynne 
case was not distinguishable from the prior case law, despite two apparent 
differences: a tax on gross receipts versus net income and a tax on 
individuals versus corporations.121 The three prior cases all concerned a 
tax on the gross receipts of corporations, whereas the Wynne case concerned 
a tax on the net income of individuals.122 A tax on gross receipts is imposed 
on a transaction before accounting for any expenses or losses, thus affecting 
a transaction “irrespective of whether it is profitable.”123 A tax on net 
income, however, is imposed on a transaction only if a “gain is shown over 
                                                                                                             
 118. See id. at 1805. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1794–95. The Court discussed the three cases in which the Court 
ruled on state income tax laws consistent with the Wynne decision: J.D. Adams 
Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938) (holding that a state tax law 
that did not offer corporations a tax credit for taxes paid to other states violated 
the dormant Commerce Clause); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 
U.S. 434 (1939) (holding that a state tax law imposed on income a corporation 
earned from shipping product outside the state violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause); and Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948) 
(holding that a state tax law imposed on income a corporation earned from its 
services provided outside the state violated the dormant Commerce Clause). 
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794–95. The decision to invalidate all three state laws turned 
on the threat of double taxation to the taxpayer and the discriminatory effect of 
the laws on interstate commerce. Id. at 1795. An important point is that the Court 
in these three cases applied the internal consistency test without explicitly 
referring to the test because it decided the cases before the phrase was coined. Id. 
at 1802. See also Walter Hellerstein, Deciphering the Supreme Court’s Opinion 
in Wynne, 123 J. TAX. 4, 5 (2015) [hereinafter Deciphering the Supreme Court’s 
Opinion in Wynne] (explaining that the cases relied on by the Wynne Court did 
not use the internal consistency test because the “doctrine would not be articulated 
for another 40 years” but “nevertheless, in substance, reflected the application of 
the doctrine”). 
 121. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795–98. 
 122. Id. 
 123. U.S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 329 (1918). 




and above expenses and losses.”124 The second difference is less technical: a 
tax on an individual means a tax on an individual taxpayer, whereas a tax on 
a corporation means a tax on a separate business entity, that is, the corporation.  
The Court rejected the gross receipts–net income distinction in favor of a 
more practical approach that allows courts to consider the effects of the tax 
rather than the form of the tax.125 The Court explained that this distinction 
between gross receipts and net income was rooted in the discarded historical 
distinction between direct and indirect burdens on interstate commerce.126 
Historically, “direct and immediate” burdens on interstate commerce were 
impermissible, although “indirect and incidental” burdens were permissible.127 
Under this rule, the Court explained that taxes on gross receipts were an 
impermissible direct burden, although taxes on net income were a permissible 
indirect burden.128 Because these distinctions provided unreliable guidance 
for lower courts, they were expressly rejected, as evidenced in a series of 
cases.129 The Court in Wynne thus regarded the gross receipts–net income 
distinction as ultimately irrelevant to its constitutional analysis.130 
Regarding the distinction between individuals and corporations, the 
Court rebutted the dissent’s claim that individuals deserve less protection 
than corporations because individuals already have protection in the form 
of voting rights.131 Although individual taxpayers have voting rights, the 
right to vote hardly provides protection to individuals burdened under the 
Maryland law because the tax likely applies to only a minority of residents 
earning interstate income.132 Additionally, the dissent suggested that 
individuals deserve less protection from taxation because they reap the 
benefits of state services, such as such as police, roadways, and fire 
departments—and thus should pay the price for those benefits.133 The 
Court noted, however, that both individuals and corporations reap these 
benefits and thus both should pay the same price and receive the same 
protection under the dormant Commerce Clause.134 
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D. The Dissent 
The four dissenting Justices in Wynne135 criticized the internal 
consistency test as applied by the majority, asserting the inconsistency of 
the test in both its application and results.136 First, the dissent argued that 
the majority’s opinion was inconsistent with prior dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. Second, the dissent claimed that the majority did in 
fact create a rule of priority with its final decision.  
1. The Inconsistency of the Internal Consistency Test 
Justice Scalia contended that Wynne contradicted principles the Court 
has articulated in its prior state taxation analyses, which he explained is 
problematic simply because it perpetuates instability.137 For example, the 
Court in Oklahoma Tax Commission made clear that the economic 
equivalence of a tax to another tax previously struck down is not 
dispositive of its constitutionality.138 Nevertheless, according to Justice 
Scalia, the majority in Wynne “strikes down a tax in part because of its 
economic similarity” to a tax the Court previously struck down.139 
Additionally, he noted that the Court in United States Glue Company found 
the distinction between a tax on gross receipts and a tax on net income to be 
“manifest and substantial,” whereas the majority in Wynne had discarded the 
same distinction.140 
Justice Ginsburg argued that the outcome in Wynne could not be 
reconciled with the Court’s decision in American Trucking, which had upheld 
a tax that failed the internal consistency test.141 Justice Ginsburg explained 
that the Court decided to uphold the tax in American Trucking because of the 
“sufficiently close connection between the tax at issue and the local conduct 
that triggered the tax.”142 Following this notion, Justice Ginsburg stated that 
the tax at issue in Wynne was materially indistinguishable from the flat tax in 
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American Trucking, and therefore the Maryland tax should overcome the 
Wynnes’ challenge.143 Justice Ginsburg explained that the only difference 
between a flat tax and an income tax is the taxpayer’s ability to pay, which 
she concluded should have been immaterial in these circumstances.144 Justice 
Ginsburg thus concluded that a flat tax based on residency and an income tax 
based on residency should have both survived under American Trucking, as 
both were imposed on taxpayers “to cover the costs of local services that all 
residents enjoy.”145 
2. The Creation of a Rule of Priority 
The dissent remained unconvinced by the majority’s argument that 
Wynne does not establish a rule of priority that favors source-based taxes 
over residence-based taxes.146 The dissent recognized that as did the 
resident state of Maryland, the source states also failed to offer a tax credit 
that could have exempted the Wynnes from paying source-based taxes 
because of income taxes already paid to Maryland.147 The majority chose 
to strike down the Maryland tax law, as opposed to the other states’ tax 
laws, despite the fact that both lacked a full tax credit.148 By striking down 
the residence-based tax imposed by Maryland, the dissent believed a rule 
of priority was created, giving preference to source-based taxes, which 
ultimately hinders a state’s ability to tax its residents—and taxes paid by 
residents are an important source of revenue that helps the state provide 
benefits to residents.149 The dissent explained that because “more is given 
to the residents of a State than to those who reside elsewhere . . . more may 
be demanded of them.”150 
III. THE INTERNAL CONSISTENCY TEST FOR THE WIN 
Although the Court’s decision in Wynne provided an unclear articulation 
of the applicable standard, the Court was correct in applying the internal 
consistency test. Despite the test’s shortcomings identified by the dissenting 
Justices, the benefits of the internal consistency test support it as the leading 
standard. In endorsing the internal consistency analysis, however, the 
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weaknesses in the majority opinion left lingering questions for courts 
applying the test in future state taxation cases. 
A. Internal Consistency as the Leading Standard 
In choosing how to resolve Wynne, the Court had several options: apply 
the internal consistency test as the majority did, apply the Complete Auto 
test as the Court had previously done, or create a new test entirely. The Court 
correctly chose to apply the internal consistency test and endorse it as the 
leading standard for dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state taxation. 
Courts can apply the test to a broad range of taxes, and the test preserves 
federalism by avoiding what would otherwise be a more intrusive, 
nationally focused orientation of state and local taxation schemes. 
1. The Internal Consistency Test Applies Simple Mathematics 
Courts confronted with a state taxation dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge after Wynne should apply the internal consistency test as Wynne 
applied it, asking whether interstate commerce would be burdened if every 
state imposed the same taxing scheme as the challenged scheme. More 
specifically, the test poses a simple mathematics question: if all 50 states 
imposed the challenged tax law, would a taxpayer pay more taxes if they 
derived income from out-of-state as opposed to in-state sources? If a 
taxpayer would pay more taxes because the taxpayer earned out-of-state 
income, interstate commerce would be burdened because individuals 
would be deterred from taking business or job opportunities outside their 
own state and instead be encouraged to pursue business opportunities 
within their own state. By evaluating challenged state taxes under the 
internal consistency test, Wynne forces courts to consider interstate 
commerce from a mathematical standpoint, which allows for objective, 
predictable, and consistent results. 
2. The Internal Consistency Test Applies to a Wide Range of Taxes  
In choosing the internal consistency test, Wynne rejected a number of 
categorical distinctions as immaterial, enabling courts to apply the test to 
a wide variety of taxes.151 The Court rejected the distinction between state 
and local taxes, gross receipts and net income taxes, and individual and 
corporation taxes.152 Analytically, the broad scope means that courts can 
apply this one test in a variety of state taxation cases, simplifying an 
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already complex area of the law and developing valuable jurisprudence for 
future applications. Practically, the broad scope means eliminating 
distinctions that are not material in the reality of taxation. 
Wynne first repudiates the distinction between “state” and “local” 
taxes, as categorized by state governments. In addressing the distinction, 
the Court confirmed prior jurisprudence and made clear that distinguishing 
between state and local taxes is immaterial because state and local taxes 
are all considered state taxes under a dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis.153 Accordingly, all income taxes paid to other states, whether 
labeled “state” taxes or “local” taxes, must be considered under the 
internal consistency test. Further, as Wynne held, a tax law that offers only 
a partial tax credit that offsets state taxes, but not county taxes, fails the 
internal consistency test. Rejecting this distinction is consistent with 
history because counties are considered “subordinate arms of [the] state 
government.”154 Additionally, rejecting this distinction is consistent with 
reality because from a practical standpoint, taxpayers likely consider the 
total amount of income taxes they owe in a given year, regardless of 
whether the taxes are paid to the county or the state. Therefore, if taxes 
create any pressure to conduct business interstate or intrastate, reasonable 
taxpayers will consider their total tax burden when making the decision 
regarding where to conduct business. 
Wynne also announced that the internal consistency test applies to 
taxes on gross receipts and taxes net income, with no reason to distinguish 
between the two.155 Although courts historically distinguished between the 
two types of taxes, Wynne acknowledged the insignificance of the 
distinction, “particularly in light of the admonition that [courts] must 
consider not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its practical 
effect.”156 This declaration broadens the scope of the internal consistency 
test, allowing courts to apply the test whenever a challenge to either type 
of tax, gross receipts or net income, presents itself. 
Last, Wynne also declared that the distinction between a tax on 
individuals and a tax on corporations is immaterial for purposes of the 
internal consistency test because both deserve the same taxation, or the 
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same protection, under the dormant Commerce Clause.157 As the majority 
discussed, both individuals and corporations enjoy benefits of the state.158 
Corporations enjoy the benefits of the state by using city utilities services 
and roadways just as individuals enjoy these same benefits. Therefore, 
corporations should be just as responsible for paying state taxes, and should 
receive no additional protection under the dormant Commerce Clause than 
individuals receive. Eliminating these three artificial distinctions allows 
courts to apply the internal consistency test to a broad range of challenged 
state taxes. 
3. The Internal Consistency Test Ensures that States Maintain 
Taxing Control 
In addition to its simplicity and broad application, the internal consistency 
test preserves federalism and autonomy of state control over its own taxing 
regime. The test provides for the evaluation of a challenged tax in isolation, 
rather than in unison with other state tax laws. The internal consistency test 
considers each state tax law in isolation by honing in on the structure of the 
challenged tax rather than the practical effects of the tax in unison with other 
state’s taxing schemes.159 The test evaluates a state tax law independently, 
thus allowing states to impose their taxes autonomously and regardless of the 
taxes other states have imposed. Although double taxation may result for 
some taxpayers,160 the internal consistency test as applied in Wynne avoids 
coordination of state taxes on a national scale, which would likely involve the 
federal government synchronizing the taxing regimes of all 50 states. 
For example, suppose Maryland imposed a 5% source tax, requiring 
taxpayers earning income in Maryland to pay Maryland 5% taxes on that 
income.161 At the same time, Delaware imposed an 8% residence tax, 
requiring taxpayers residing in Delaware to pay Delaware 8% taxes on 
income earned anywhere.162 A Delaware resident may be taxed in Delaware 
by virtue of his or her status as a resident and taxed in Maryland for the portion 
of income he or she earns in Maryland. If these states are considered in 
isolation, as the internal consistency test requires, both taxes pass the internal 
consistency test and therefore would survive a dormant Commerce Clause 
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challenge under Wynne.163 Maryland’s tax would survive because if all 50 
states imposed the Maryland tax law, interstate commerce would not be 
burdened; Delaware’s tax law would likewise survive because if all 50 
states imposed the Delaware tax law, interstate commerce would not be 
burdened. The result of double taxation, which would occur when an 
individual lives in Delaware and works in Maryland, is irrelevant under 
the internal consistency test. Rather, each state tax, when considered in 
isolation, passes the test. Also, Delaware in this example survives a 
dormant Commerce Clause challenge because, unlike Wynne, Delaware 
did not impose a tax on non-residents. 
If the Court intended to eliminate double taxation, however, then 
internal consistency as applied in Wynne, which takes a purely state-
focused approach, would not be the solution. The only way to avoid double 
taxation would be to infringe on the states’ autonomy by controlling each 
state’s taxing regime. Avoiding double taxation would require that the 
Court impose a national approach, such as a rule of priority, that 
coordinates the tax laws of all 50 states, which would likely require that 
all taxes on state income be either residence based or source based.  
B. Criticism for the Court: Lingering Questions for Lower Courts 
Succeeding in selecting the best standard for future state taxation cases 
does not mean that the Wynne opinion was entirely satisfactory. Rather, 
the opinion lacked critical explanations and answers, ones that lower 
courts will now have to tackle independently. 
1. Failing to Explain the Rule of Priority 
The Wynne majority denied adopting any rule of priority among 
competing income taxes,164 but the denial was poorly explained and 
appears contrary to logic. As the dissent discussed, a rule of priority would 
be one that prioritized source-based income taxes over residence-based 
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income taxes.165 The majority provided only one example to serve as the 
entire explanation for why Wynne did not create a rule of priority—the 
Court suggested that Maryland could offer a full tax credit instead of a 
partial one for income taxes paid to other states.166  
The example the majority provided, however, is seemingly consistent 
with a rule of priority. Although a full tax credit might allow Maryland to 
keep collecting income taxes from residents in some instances, whenever 
a taxpayer owes income taxes to both Maryland and to the other state 
where the taxpayer earned the income, the other state’s tax will trump. 
Maryland will collect income taxes from residents earning income out-of-
state only when the source state does not impose an income tax or when the 
source state imposes an income tax that is less than Maryland’s. Therefore, 
whenever the source state’s income tax and Maryland’s income tax 
compete, the full tax credit will offset some or all of what Maryland can 
collect from its own resident. Thus, the majority’s example is an application 
of the rule of priority. Had the Court further explained itself, however, 
Maryland potentially could have cured the unconstitutionality by removing 
its tax on non-residents in lieu of expanding its tax credit. 
Because of this disconnect, the Court should have more clearly 
explained why Wynne does not create a rule of priority. The complexity of 
state taxation should compel the Court to err on the side of clarity and 
explain further why no rule was adopted, beyond offering only one example. 
The Court likely denied adopting a rule of priority because doing so would 
interfere with federalism. It appears, however, that the majority spoke too 
quickly and too broadly.  
2. Failing to Address the External Consistency Test 
Wynne’s acceptance of the internal consistency test leaves lower 
courts guessing on the applicability of the external consistency test. The 
Court’s silence could be interpreted as making the internal consistency test 
the sole inquiry, or it could be interpreted as having no effect on the second 
tier of the test adopted in Oklahoma Tax Commission. The second 
possibility remains viable, as Wynne did not necessitate the follow-up 
inquiry regarding external consistency because the tax failed the internal 
consistency test. Whether the Court failed to acknowledge the test because 
it determined the test unnecessary or because it sought to expunge the test 
will be determined by future litigation. 
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Nevertheless, the external consistency test is not necessary to evaluate 
state taxation appropriately under dormant Commerce Clause challenges; 
it would also add confusion to an already complicated area of the law. The 
internal consistency test, as it currently stands, properly evaluates state 
taxation for interstate commerce burdens, as the simple mathematics 
illustrates. Thus, courts should interpret the Wynne decision as requiring 
internal consistency as the sole inquiry. 
3. Failing to Clarify the American Trucking Decision 
After the Court boldly refused to strike down a tax that failed the 
internal consistency test in American Trucking, some commentators 
suspected that the internal consistency test might be completely dead.167 
Wynne proves, however, that the internal consistency test is still alive, and 
now turns the tables by casting doubt on the continued validity of 
American Trucking.168 Specifically, the Wynne Court failed to clarify the 
standing of its earlier decision by poorly distinguishing the case rather than 
overruling it. This failure should lead lower courts to view American 
Trucking as an exception to the internal consistency test—that is, a tax 
may fail the internal consistency test but nevertheless be upheld under 
American Trucking. 
Recall that the Court in American Trucking upheld the challenged flat 
tax under the dormant Commerce Clause because companies would be 
burdened only if they chose to engage in intrastate business, rather than 
burdened if they chose to engage in interstate business.169 In reconciling 
Wynne and American Trucking, these cases create a non-contradictory 
rule: if a tax fails the internal consistency test because it burdens interstate 
commerce, but that burden results from the taxpayer choosing to engage 
in intrastate business, the tax does not violate the dormant Commerce 
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Clause.170 This is the exception that the Court created by its rulings in these 
two cases. 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg analogized Wynne to American 
Trucking, finding that a flat tax based on residency in Maryland, rather 
than an income tax on Maryland residents who earned income in other 
states, might have been upheld under the American Trucking exception to 
the internal consistency test.171 A flat tax would apply to any resident 
living within the state’s boundaries, unrelated to any income earned. 
Following Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning, the Maryland taxpayer’s choice 
to live in Maryland is the equivalent of the choice to engage in intrastate 
business.172 Furthermore, she believed the analogy should not stop at flat 
taxes, but that courts should consider applying American Trucking in cases 
beyond a flat tax. Consider the Maryland tax in question in Wynne. If the 
Wynnes were considered interstate actors because of their residence in one 
state and investment in multiple other states, their choice to live in 
Maryland is the choice to engage in intrastate activity. The choice to 
engage in intrastate activity could trigger the American Trucking 
exception. Specifically, the Wynnes suffer the consequences of the partial 
tax credit only because they chose to live in a state that offered only a 
partial tax credit, much like the truckers in American Trucking suffered 
the consequences of the flat tax only because they chose to conduct 
activity in Michigan. 
Justice Ginsburg, however, overstated the analogy and missed a 
relevant difference. Unlike the choice of doing business within a state, a 
taxpayer has no choice but to reside in one state. Therefore, claiming that 
the taxpayer chooses to engage in intrastate activity by simply residing in one 
state is not the same as claiming that a taxpayer chooses to engage in intrastate 
activity by operating his business in a certain state. Although the American 
Trucking exception functions properly under some circumstances, with the 
limits of the exception to be determined by future litigation, the exception 
cannot reach as far as Justice Ginsburg suggested. 
CONCLUSION 
Taxation causes judges, scholars, states, and taxpayers enough 
confusion. Historically, the Supreme Court has done little to simplify this 
inherently complex area, wavering between the Complete Auto test and 
internal consistency test when analyzing state taxation under the dormant 
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Commerce Clause. Wynne gave the Court the opportunity to refine its 
jurisprudence, and the Court failed to do so clearly. However, this 
Comment sheds light on the murky opinion and interprets the opinion as 
endorsing the internal consistency test as the reigning standard. This 
effective and straightforward test applies to a wide range of taxes while 
still giving states autonomy in imposing state taxes. Choosing the leading 
standard does not come without criticism, however, as the majority’s 
opinion in Wynne suffered from other weaknesses of poor explanations 
and illogical analyses. Nevertheless, with refunds for taxes and at least 
some clarity in the law, taxpayers and courts alike can rejoice. 
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